Author Archives: SHG

The Right To Fly Solo, Because…

The old maxim that “a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client” might be said to be true in spades for the non-lawyer, but that doesn’t mean that people don’t have a constitutional right to be foolish.  In Indiana v. Edwards,  argued yesterday before the Supreme Court, the issue was framed around who level of competency was necessary before a state court could decide that a person who was otherwise competent to stand trial was not sufficiently competent to represent himself.

It proved to be a rather difficult question for the court, as discussed at SCOTUSBlog, where drawing a brightline test proved elusive.  Was it mental acuity, communication skills, demeanor (turning the proceedings into a farce) that put pro se representation over the line?  And when would this determination be made, at the earliest possible time or not until trial?

It’s easy to say that people who are incompetent or mentally challenged lack the capacity to represent themselves, and most of us would agree that a defendant without a certain skill level or depth of understanding should not be allowed to make disastrously bad decisions that result in his conviction, as the conviction would lack legitimacy.  But these are highly subjective calls, and the strike at the heart of an individual’s right to make choices about their lives, for better or worse.  In America, we are allowed to be stupid when it comes to our own choices.  We just have to bear the consequences.

But a secondary debate has developed as a result of this case, generated by a very controversial argument made by Lawprof Erica Hashimoto at Concurring Opinions.  It wasn’t sufficient for Erica to champion the idea that self-representation is a right, and that her somewhat empirical study supported the notion that self-representation doesn’t necessarily produce worse results for defendants.  Had she stopped here, it would not have raised much distress.  But she didn’t.

Before joining the cloister, Erica spent four years as a federal defender in Washington, D.C., where she apparently developed a belief that indigent defenders are, well, lacking.  Hence, she felt compelled to add the following to her argument:


Once the Court recognized a right to counsel in Gideon, the government had to appoint counsel for indigent defendants who could not afford counsel. Those lawyers are paid by the government for their representation of the defendant. This raises (at least) two concerns in the minds of many defendants: first, many of the lawyers are paid very little, so the quality of state-appointed counsel can be pretty abysmal; and second, the lawyer is being paid by the government, and the lawyer therefore may feel some allegiance to the same government that is prosecuting the defendant. There is a lot of evidence that there is validity to both of these concerns. Stories of ineptness by court-appointed lawyers fill the federal reporters, and there also are many stories of lawyers who attempt to curry favor with prosecutors and judges by ensuring that their clients plead guilty so that they can continue to be appointed in other cases.

In other words, the right to self-representation isn’t merely a right, but a necessity because of the incompetence of indigent defenders and their fealty to their paymasters.  Holy wars have broken out over less.

While there “might” be some merit to the argument that defendants “perceive” these allegations to be true, to suggest that they simply are is not merely blasphemy, but wrong.  What is particularly surprising, no shocking, is that a lawprof would smear an entire category of lawyer with one ridiculously broad brush.  While there’s a dearth of dignity across the blawgosphere, the lawprofs generally try to adhere to a higher standard.  This falls far below it.

As Gideon is  rightfully enraged by this smear, so to am I.  Skelly  isn’t amused either. Most good lawyers recognize that there are bad lawyers, and try to aid the public in distinguishing between the two.  But bad lawyers are bad regardless of their employer and area of practice.  They embarrass us and bring disrepute to the profession as a whole.  What they do not do is band together to find employment as indigent defenders. 

Perpetuating the myth that legal aid, federal defenders, private indigent defenders are all cut of the same defective cloth does worse than a mere disservice to the law and to the defendants who necessarily rely on them.  It actively brings hatred and disdain upon men and women who provide spectacular service to those in need. 

There are incompetent lawyers along the spectrum of criminal defense, from the storefront private lawyers to the Biglaw ex-prosecutor wannabes and everywhere in between.  There are also brilliant lawyers along the same spectrum.  There is no discrete group where all the idiots go to work, the ones who can’t argue their way out of a paper bag or are too lazy, greedy, stupid to be trusted with the representation of another.  They are everywhere.  Why would Erica pinpoint indigent defenders are being particularly incompetent or unethical?

To the extent I can find any rational basis for her views, it’s because her experience as a federal defender gave her a closer view of the people she worked with, and left her feeling that some were not up to snuff.  That may well be true, but she has failed to recognize that those lawyers with whom she was less familiar, the private criminal defense bar, weren’t necessarily any better.  There’s a tendency to be more critical of the familiar, and Erica should have been cognizant of this and tempered her allegations accordingly.

There was no need in the world for Erica to attack indigent defense in order to bolster her view that there is a right of self-representation, as well as a need.  The need is justified by the fact that an individual’s life is at stake, and that individual has primary right to protect and defend himself without having to sublimate his position on how to do so to the choices, tactics, skills and efforts of another person, even if that other person is a lawyer.  As I’ve often said, when the jury convicts, it’s the defendant, not the lawyer, who does the time.  Therefore, it is the defendant who must live with his choices.  He has the right to make the choices since he will live with the consequences.

While I have not gone through the transcript of oral argument, and instead relied on Lyle Denniston’s very thorough description, it appears that the Court will have a very difficult time drawing a line where a defendant’s competencies are simply too low to permit pro se representation.  But regardless of how the Court limits or defines the dividing line, it is no reflection on the skill or ethics of indigent defenders.  And Erica would do well to rethink her need to justify her position by wrongly denigrating them.

Vouching For Your Client’s Innocence (Update)

Walter Olsen at  Overlawyered raises the ethical question of the propriety of a lawyer stating that his client is innocent.  While it started out via the Dickie Scruggs case, and wound its way through the Mel Weiss case, the ethical issue is one that permeates criminal defense, and a trap for lawyers who find themselves put on the spot.

Lawyers aren’t witnesses.  We don’t necessarily “know” anything about the case, other than what our clients tell us and what the hard evidence shows us.  We may believe what we are told, but we don’t “know” it to be true.  This presents a conundrum.

Generally, the only time we are placed in the position of having to vouch for our clients or, by our failure to do so, burn them, is when there is media attention and the lawyer is caught unprepared.  A reporter will naturally try to nail you down by asking, “Did he do it?” 

Don’t be angry about it, that’s the reporter’s job.  He’s not interested in your ethical obligation, or the highly nuanced position of a criminal defense lawyer.  He wants a sound bite, something to fill those 10 seconds on the 6 o’clock broadcast in between his sensationalist version of the facts and his brilliant commentary.

But where does the lawyer fit into this potential trainwreck?  The obvious answer is to anticipate that this question will be asked, frequently over and over with numerous variations on a theme, and be prepared to respond without committing yourself or your client to proclamation of innocence that will later return to embarrass you.

Why should it be embarrassing?  Because the lawyer stakes his own credibility on the innocence of the defendant, something that is outside his knowledge or control.  The issue arises because the lawyer fears that his failure to proclaim his client’s innocence suggests that he’s guilty.  After all, it’s one of the other, and if he’s not innocent, then the choices are limited.

This is why its critical to anticipate the question and be prepared to respond in a way that it factually accurate and protect your client’s interest without undermining your credibility and ethics in the process.  There is the basis level of response, that smells peculiar but tends to suffice when you’ve got nothing else up your sleeve.  For example, responding with, “we have every intention to fight this case and every expectation of winning.”  Or “We intend to zealously challenge the allegations against the defendant at trial.”  Responsive, but without vouching for the client’s innocence.

As Walter notes, of course, these are the typical lawyer non-responsive responses.


We may chuckle at the lawyerly phrasings involved here — only beginners fail to catch on that the client’s actual innocence is not being asserted. But behind those lawyerly phrasings is an impulse that at least deserves respect: to get the client’s case on the table (when the situation calls for doing that) without in fact turning the lawyer into a liar. (Other legitimate purposes might also be served as well; for example, a lawyer’s endorsement of false frame-up theories might tend to poison relations between members of the bar and undermine public confidence in the workings of justice.)

But as he also correctly notes, ethical proscriptions control what we can and should say. 

With a little thought and effort, we can avoid making a statement that commits to a false theory, vouches for a client’s (or witness’) innocence or honesty, or converts us from lawyer to witness.  While it may seem like a reporter’s put a gun to your head when he asks the straightforward question, “did he do it,” that’s part of the job of being a criminal defense lawyer. 

Don’t compromise your client, but don’t confuse your role as lawyer for the defense with witness for the defense.  If you put your ethics and credibility on the line and lose them, neither you nor your client will benefit.

Update:  In the comments below, Bennett raises a good point.  A defendant is “presumed innocent,” which should suffice for the purpose of publicly stating his innocence without jeopardizing ethics or credibility.  I don’t believe it works out this way.  A presumption is not the same as an affirmative representation of fact.  It is the absence of fact to the contrary. 

Certainly, no one wants to smile to the cameras and say, “My client is presumed innocent, and that’s my story and I’m sticking with it.”  It’s tantamount to saying, “but for the presumption, that rat is guilty as sin.”  That’s not going to play very well.  So while I appreciate where Mark’s coming from, its too much of a lawyer-game to bank on the presumption and vouch for legal innocence when the rest of the world is going to hear factual innocence.  And that’s my story and I’m sticking with it.

Banks New Tactic: Smear DataTreasury

We  recently posted about how Alabama Republican Senator Jeff Sessions stuck an amendment into the patent reform bill designed to take the burden off his pals at the nation’s largest commercial backs and screw a small company that owns the patents that the banks want to use for free.  The net of the amendment will be to shift the cost of the infringement off the banks and onto the taxpayers. 

The battle has now taken a turn for the worst, with banks trying smear DataTreasury and its principles publicly in order to turn attention away from the facts, according to this post at Politico.


Bank lobbyists categorize DataTreasury as a “patent troll,” a slur used in the intellectual property world to describe small companies that hold patents but do not produce any products.

“DataTreasury is Exhibit A of what’s wrong in the system,” says Steve Bartlett, CEO of the Financial Services Roundtable, an association that represents the country’s 100 largest financial services firms. “The law is tilted so badly in favor of plaintiffs that have no products and yet extort billions of dollars.”

When the word “patent” is mentioned, people’s eyes generally glaze over.  There’s nothing sexy about patents.  Sorry, patent lawyer guys, but that’s the truth.  But add the word “troll” after it, and it suddenly gets interesting.  Of course, another name for “patent troll” is the owner of a patent that somebody else wants to use without having to pay for it.


“This is a desperate smear by a group of companies that have tried every other trick in the book and failed. Now what they are trying to do is assassinate the character of DataTreasury’s officers,” says company spokesman Eric Wetzel. “This special interest legislation is a clear example of large corporate infringers aggressively going after small companies.”

Unfortunately, it appears that smear tactics are working fairly well, judging from the reactions to this post.  Since so many people know so little about patents, and the smear is so much more interesting than the facts, many people are doing what comes naturally, jumping to erroneous baseless conclusions because it’s just so much easier than knowing what you’re talking about.

On the flip side, people who are knowledgeable about patents, the law and the facts are coming out in overwhelming support of DataTreasury, trying their best to respond to those who prefer smear to facts and clarify this arcane area of the law.

The funny part about this campaign by the big banks to buy their way out of patent infringement with donations to Jeff Sessions’ campaign is that everybody will take sudden, but belated, interest in this fiasco when the bill comes due and has to be paid by the American taxpayer.  But you don’t mind, do you?  After all, I’m sure you want to show as much love to Citibank as Citibank shows to you.


Fear As A Legitimate Prosecutorial Tactic

A  fascinating  discussion has broken out a Defending People, where the Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett, has challenged his District Attorney wannabe, Kelly Siegler, for training her minions to use the tactic of fear.  Seigler’s advice to young prosecutors in Houston is to “make the jury afraid” in order to get that conviction.  Bennett disagrees:


Make people afraid isn’t about empowering them to act on their fear. It’s not “play on people’s fears” but “make people afraid.” Manipulate them, in other words, by causing them to feel fear that they wouldn’t otherwise feel.

In the subsequent discussion, a number of prosecutorial types argue that this is a legitimate thing to do. As is often the case, the debaters recast the issue in their own fashion, using their characterization to show that they “get it” while others don’t.  For example, one argues:


I feel that “fear” and making a jury understand how scary a scenario might have been for a Complainant is a legitimate consideration for juries.

Of course, this is a strawman argument, since it has now connected the fear to the facts, the very point that Bennett disputes.

But the question remains, if only the spinners could focus on the primary question, whether the strategic use of fear to manipulate a jury is an appropriate strategy.  Before addressing this, a caveat:  The underling facts may give rise to fear by their nature.  That the government’s case may evoke fear is not strategic, but inherent.  They come by fear naturally because the facts of the case give rise to fear.  This is not the topic at hand. 

The subject of Mark’s post is whether prosecutors should deliberately create an atmosphere of fear of crime, unrelated to the particular facts of a given case, in order to manipulate a jury to be more susceptible to conviction without regard to the evidence in the case. 

The answer is clearly no, this is not a legitimate tactic.  If a person is to be convicted, it is because of the conduct in which they have engaged.  The last thing we need is less attention to the evidence of guilt.

To create a climate of fear is to appeal to prejudice.  Make a jury afraid of crime in general, and cloud their vision of the only issue at hand.  Did THIS defendant commit THIS crime.

What is particularly disturbing about the question is how it takes such a misguided approach to the prosecutorial function.  It is not the job of the state to get convictions at any price, but to do everything within its power to only convict the guilty.  When the government goes outside the evidence to increase its chances of getting a conviction, to manipulate a jury, to create an atmosphere in a courtroom designed to divert the jury’s attention from the evidence in the case to some general sense of fear, it has failed in its ethical and legal duty and has undermined the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.

Fear, disconnected from the facts, is never a legitimate strategy of the prosecution.  It’s painful to see so many argue to the contrary.  No matter how hard they try to spin the issue, a conviction based upon anything other than facts as proven by evidence reflects a miscarriage of justice. 



How Many Wrongful Convictions Are Acceptable?

According to Liptak, Justice Scalia believes that


The rate at which innocent people are convicted of felonies is, he said, less than three-hundredths of 1 percent — .027 percent, to be exact. That rate, he said, is acceptable. “One cannot have a system of criminal punishment without accepting the possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly,” he wrote. “That is a truism, not a revelation.”

But that rate is based on a false number, failing to account for the potential innocents convicted for crimes other than murder and rape who are subsequently exonerated by DNA.  For somewhat obvious reasons, one cannot use the absolute number of DNA exonerations, 214 at this writing, and divide by the total number of all felony convictions.  Well, you can, but you end up with a totally wrong number.

Liptak takes this application of math to show that we don’t know, and can’t say, how many innocents are convicted.


What the debate demonstrates is that we know almost nothing about the number of innocent people in prison. That is because any effort to estimate it involves extrapolation from just two numbers, neither one satisfactory.

We are left with an uneasy agreement between Professor Gross and Mr. Marquis on at least one point. “Once we move beyond murder and rape cases,” Professor Gross wrote, “we know very little about any aspect of false conviction.”

While it is a truism that we cannot know with precision, particularly in a system that involves so many variables as criminal justice, the real number of “casualties”, I suspect we can do a whole lot better than Liptak does, and that his willingness to give up so easily is a disservice to an important topic.

There are at least five prominent sources of wrongful convictions:



  • Mistaken eyewitness identification

  • Perjurious testimony (testilying)

  • False confession

  • Racial influence

  • Guilty pleas of convenience

If we look to the cases where innocence is subsequently determined by DNA evidence, in order to use a hard measure to determine a factually wrongful conviction, and then go back to the basis upon which the conviction was obtained, we can then extrapolate statistically the percentage of the total conviction rate, based upon the mechanism of conviction, of innocent people.


But a few general lessons can be drawn nonetheless. Black men are more likely to be falsely convicted of rape than are white men, particularly if the victim is white. Juveniles are more likely to confess falsely to murder. Exonerated defendants are less likely to have serious criminal records. People who maintain their innocence are more likely to be innocent. The longer it takes to solve a crime, the more likely the defendant is not guilty.

So do we accept the premise that the system isn’t perfect, something we know to be true, and just shrug off the question of whether the number of innocent people wrongfully convicted of crimes is an “acceptable” number of casualties in the war against crime, or do we try to do better, think a little harder, and come up with numbers that have some real bearing on the problem? 

Without this number, the degree of “imperfection” in the criminal justice system is too abstract to disturb most people about how well or poorly our system works.  People don’t get too concerned over abstractions, unless it happens to hit them where they live.  As my good buddy Mike from the train tells me, “Hey, somebody has to take one for the team, as long as it isn’t one of mine.”  I suspect most people feel that way in their hearts.

Liptak settles far too easily.  But then, neither he nor any of his loved ones are sitting in a prison cell.

Texas Win Could Cost American Lives

The Supreme Court has answered that age old question, when is a treaty not a treaty, in its decision in Medellin v. Texas.  While the  lawprofs are in  agreement that it is a sound decision on a technical issue about self-effective treaties, this decision reflects dangerous policy that stands to put Americans abroad at risk.  The facts of the case are set forth here.

The question is when is a treaty a treaty?  The Constitution puts the authority to enter treaties with foreign nations in the hands of the President with the approval of the Senate.  It strikes me that this is a sound approach, but regardless of whether you believe this is an undemocratic process, it’s what the Constitution provides.  America thinks it has a deal.  The foreign nation thinks it has a deal.  Both treat each other, and their citizens, as if it has a deal, assuming that both sides act in good faith.  We hope that they do.

But this decision tells us that our treaties need no longer apply, at least to the states in the execution of their domestic law, unless the treaty is “self-enforcing”.


The Supreme Court’s decision in effect requires that treaties can’t be used to override American domestic law unless the treaties have first been clearly endorsed by our domestic democratic processes in a way that evidences an intention to have them be “self-enforcing.” Otherwise, courts might end up enforcing treaties that the president and Senate ratified only because they expected them to be unenforceable exercises in public relations – “cheap talk,” as political scientists call it. Obviously, “cheap talk” treaties are unlikely to get as much scrutiny from the democratic process as ones that are expected to be enforceable.

We have “cheap talk” treaties?  Why?  What purpose is our government serving by entering into treaties that no one ever intends to live with?

While the democratization of our treaty process is a matter to be taken up internally if it bothers Americans, in the meantime our country has cut deals with other countries.  In this instance, it was a deal to allow foreign nationals the opportunity to contact their country’s representative when they’ve been arrested. 

I want that for Americans abroad too.  I do not want Americans in some third world country held in secret prisons, unable to reach the consulate and obtain assistance, or even let their family know they are alive.  I do not want Americans disappearing in foreign nations, never to be heard from again.  The price of giving Medellin a new trial on a murder charge is hardly worth the lives of Americans in foreign lands suffering an unknown fate because the treaty our country, our President, our Senate, agreed upon is now only good for toilet paper.

While the Constitution proclaims a duly enacted treaty to be the Supreme Law, it does not contain an asterisk to a footnote that includes the proviso, “but only if it is ‘self-enforcing.”  I’ve read a handful of explanations of what this is supposed to mean, and the best understanding comes from SCOTUSBlog :


Perhaps the most striking aspect of today’s Medellin decision was the Court’s professed willingness to defer to Congress when it comes to deciding which decisions of foreign tribunals are binding on U.S. courts. The majority stated that it would have been quite willing to be bound by the International Court of Justice’s determination of U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention, if Congress had decreed that U.S. courts should be so bound.

In other words, first a treaty is negotiated, approved by the Senate and signed by the President.  They hold a photo-op and everybody smiles.  Then it’s up to Congress, if and when it gets around to it, to decide whether the treaty means anything to the United States.  The Supremes have decided that this one extra step is needed before we are internally bound to live up to our treaties.

From a legalistic standpoint, the Supreme Court’s decision may well be right.  Since I’m hardly a scholar on the subject, I can’t say.  But from a policy perspective, this is just a foolish, counterproductive and potentially dangerous way to conduct international relations. 

If the United States does not intend to adhere to its treaties, then don’t enter them.  If we enter a treaty with a foreign nation, then it ought to mean something.  If a secondary approval procedure, beyond that of the Constitution is necessary to make a treaty effective upon us, then the process should be changed to reflect the reality.

But if we expect foreign nations to live up to their treaty obligations, so should we.  And if we play games like this with our treaties, then we have no reasonable expectation that other countries will honor theirs.  The price of this game is American lives abroad, and it’s too high a price.

Apology To Cookeville Cop, More or Less

A while back, I  posted about a video that was supposed to show a Cookeville, Tennesee cop planting marijuana on a perp that was caught on the dash cam.

Today, a heads up came in from  Walter Olson that Carlos Ferell, who claimed that it was planted pot, now admits that he had the grass all along.  I owe Officer Chris Melton an apology for this, and thank Walter for letting me know.

Ferell is suing for the use of excessive force because the police dog bit him on the arm and leg, but now the claim that he was framed is out the window.  Without the allegation that the cop planted the pot on the perp, this is just another “dog bites man” story.

Justice Is Circular in Alabama

From Turley, this bizarre tale of Alabama judicial sensibilities, where Presiding Covington County Circuit Judge M. Ashley McKathan was “cited for ordering 100 people to form a “circle of prayer” and then dropping to his knees in prayer in his courtroom.”

While the facial church/state issue is too painfully obvious for further discussion, there are two things that are just too precious to ignore.  First, the local story on the subject, posted at MSNBC, is entitled:

Ala. judge draws ACLU scorn for circle of prayer in courtroom

That’s right.  No problem with a judge holding a prayer circle in a courtroom.  The problem is those darn (pseudo-Yankee) ACLU heathen agitators, bothering a good ol’ boy who’s beseeching the good lord for guidance and justice. 

Then, the Alabama Press-Register, that liberal rag, posts an editorial condemning Judge McKathan’s conduct, stating that anybody with a law degree ought to know that you can’t do that.  But the editorial goes on to say:

Judge McKathan probably had good intentions. Indeed, the parties may be able to resolve their dispute if they seek spiritual guidance according to their church’s teachings.

But good intentions or not, the judge’s behavior was inappropriate.

Unfortunately, it wasn’t the first time Judge McKathan let his religion interfere with his responsibilities as a judge. He garnered much-deserved criticism in 2004 when he took up the habit of wearing a robe to court that was embroidered with the Ten Commandments.

At a minimum, Judge McKathan should give the case to another judge. In the meantime, someone with direct knowledge of his behavior would show good judgment by taking the incident up with the Judicial Inquiry Commission.

Could the editors’ condemnation of this deliberate insertion of religion into judicial proceedings be, oh, a tad more forceful?

No doubt there is something about this courtroom (or the good people who live in the area surrounding it) that I just don’t understand.  But I cannot help but wonder what’s going through their minds down there.

A Criminal Failure to Protect

The front page of the  New York Times had a story about a young man named Billy Wolfe from Fayetteville, Arkansas.  It was one of the saddest, most pathetic stories I’ve read in a very long time.  The title was “A Boy the Bullies Love to Beat Up, Repeatedly,”  a title worth noting.

For reasons unknown, one day when he was 12, Billy Wolfe became the target of some inexplicable schoolyard hatred that gave rise to his being beaten.  Regularly.  By all his classmates.  People would just come up to Billy and punch him hard. 



It began years ago when a boy called the house and asked Billy if he wanted to buy a certain sex toy, heh-heh. Billy told his mother, who informed the boy’s mother. The next day the boy showed Billy a list with the names of 20 boys who wanted to beat Billy up.


Things got worse. At Woodland Junior High School, some boys in a wood shop class goaded a bigger boy into believing that Billy had been talking trash about his mother. Billy, busy building a miniature house, didn’t see it coming: the boy hit him so hard in the left cheek that he briefly lost consciousness.


The pain of being the whipping boy must be horrible.  This should happen to no child, ever.  But that’s what school officials are there to prevent, right?  In loco parentis, they must safeguard their charges from harm.  But not Billy.


Whatever the reason, addressing the bullying of Billy has become a second job for his parents: Curt, a senior data analyst, and Penney, the owner of an office-supply company. They have binders of school records and police reports, along with photos documenting the bruises and black eyes. They are well known to school officials, perhaps even too well known, but they make no apologies for being vigilant. They also reject any suggestion that they should move out of the district because of this.

What are school officials doing about it?


Ms. Wolfe remembers the family dentist sewing up the inside of Billy’s cheek, and a school official refusing to call the police, saying it looked like Billy got what he deserved. Most of all, she remembers the sight of her son.

“He kept spitting blood out,” she says, the memory strong enough still to break her voice.

This is the point in the story where you feel the surge of bile rising in your throat.  Anger suddenly shifts from these mindlessly vicious boys to the grown-ups who are supposed to protect a child from this.


Not long after, a boy on the school bus pummeled Billy, but somehow Billy was the one suspended, despite his pleas that the bus’s security camera would prove his innocence. Days later, Ms. Wolfe recalls, the principal summoned her, presented a box of tissues, and played the bus video that clearly showed Billy was telling the truth.

As so often is the case, school justice somehow nails the victim since no one ever sees the aggressor and assumes that the defense against violence presents the full picture.  One would think that teachers and school bus drivers might eventually come to realize how this works, but that would be asking way too much.


Judging by school records, at least one official seems to think Billy contributes to the trouble that swirls around him. For example, Billy and the boy who punched him at the bus stop had exchanged words and shoves a few days earlier.

But Ms. Wolfe scoffs at the notion that her son causes or deserves the beatings he receives. She wonders why Billy is the only one getting beaten up, and why school officials are so reluctant to punish bullies and report assaults to the police.

Dealing with problems like this, which fail to be adequately described by “bullying”, after so many years is absurd.  Sure, the principal doesn’t want to call the police on students, but the flaw in his reasoning is that he failed to deal with the beating of a student in the first place, and put an end to it, hard and fast.  How can an adult who purports to care about children permit this to continue unabated?  How can anyone tolerate this adult’s blaming the victim?

No child should go to school to suffer regular beatings at the hands of other students.  Any school official who has tolerated the beating of a child should bear the consequences, and in Billy’s case, the neglect is criminal.

Newsflash! Governor Paterson Is Human

Better that it all comes out up front, per this  Newsday story that New York’s new Governor David Paterson smoked pot and tooted some coke in his misbegotten youth.

I believe that we may have reached the point when Bill Clinton was elected that we came to realize that people coming of age in the 60s and 70s, maybe even the 80s, engaged in illegal drug activities.  Not all, of course.  There will always be a few nerds who were so out of touch, so disconnected to the rest of society, that they behaved themselves in a manner that would make their mother proud.  But these people weren’t, how to say this nicely, normal.

For better or worse, this was the way that normal youth acted in those halcyon days when a new world was dawning and freedom was the predominant interest.  Kids smoked dope.  Not all the time.  Not every day.  But pretty much everybody did it at some point, if only to find out what it was all about if nothing else.  It was pervasive.  It was culturally fundamental. 

The fact that this is a story at all borders on the ludicrous.  How many Newsday reporters over the age of 35 never touched pot or coke?  Yeah, sure, and none of them ever wore Huckapoo shirts either when they went dancing at Studio 54. 

It’s time we started viewing our elected officials from the presumptive position that they did what normal people did when they were young.  And they grew up and got past it.  Talk about the hypocrisy of having used drugs and growing up to put other drug users and sellers in jail all you want.  That’s fair game. 

If you want news about a politician, tell me about the one who grew up during this period and didn’t use drugs.  That guy’s either a freak or a liar.  I’d keep my eye on him.